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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented to this Court is whether the Circuit 
Court properly granted American Concept's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and ruled, as a matter of law, that Plaintiffs did not 
have insurance coverage after September 12, 1985 at 12:01 a.m. 
standard time 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE RULE 
Following is the text of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 56(c): 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith 
if the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE (pASE 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against American Concept 
Insurance Company seeking coverage for an automobile accident that 
occurred on September 14, 1985, and alleged theories of breach of 
contract, estoppel and waiver. American Concept denied plaintiffs' 
claim of coverage on the basis plaintiff$' policy had automatically 
terminated on September 12, 1985 at 12;01 a.m. standard time for 
nonpayment of renewal premium and there was no waiver or estoppel 
that prevented American Concept from enforcing the contract 
according to its express terms. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
American Concept's Motion for Summary Judgment as to all 
causes of action was granted on March 4, 1987, after submission of 
written memorandum and an oral argument at which both sides 
presented argument. The Order and Judgment (R.126-127) dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint on the merits and with prejudice was signed 
April 13, 1987. The Court concluded, as a matter of law, there was 
no insurance coverage to plaintiff at the time of the automobile 
accident. Plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal was filed May 13, 1987 
(R.129); the Appellate Bond was not filed until May 20, 1987 
(R.131). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 1953, § 78-29-3(2)(c), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Plaintiffs and American Concept entered into an 
insurance contract for private property and liability coverage on 
plaintiffs' 1980 Mercury Capri (R.83-108, Policy; R.81, Declaration 
Sheet). The contract was from September 12, 1984, 12:01 a.m. 
standard time until September 12, 1985, 12:01 a.m. standard time 
(R.81). The policy period was stated on the insurance identifica-
tion card (R.79), original declaration record (R.81), amended 
declaration record (R.80), renewal billing and notice of expiration 
of coverage (R.110). 
2. The insurance contract, a copy of which was in 
plaintiffs' possession (R.26), specially states the contract 
provisions on renewals as follows: "Automatic Termination. If we 
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provisions on renewals as follows: "Automatic Termination, If we 
offer to renew or continue and you or your representative do not 
accept, this policy will automatically terminate at the end of the 
current policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or 
continuation premium when due shall mean that you have not accepted 
our offer • . • The effective date of cancellation stated in the 
notice shall become the end of the policy period." (R.94). 
3. On August 13, 1985, a renewal billing and notice of 
expiration of coverage was sent to the plaintiffs. The Notice 
again informs plaintiffs that coverage i$ automatically terminating 
on September 12, 1985, and that payment must be made to the company 
prior to the due date (R.110). Plaintiffs do not dispute receipt 
of the renewal billing and notice (R.30)* 
4. Plaintiffs failed to make the payment to the company 
prior to the due date. Plaintiffs' premium, postmarked September 
13, 1985 (R.125), was not received by the company until September 
16, 1985, over four days AFTER coverage was terminated (R.112). 
Plaintiffs claim it was mailed September 12, 1985 (R.25, 115). 
The premium was returned to plaintiffs on the day it was received 
(R.113). 
5. Per the contract terms, on September 12, 1985 at 
12:01 a.m. standard time, plaintiffs' contract with American 
Concept automatically terminated by plaintiffs' failure to pay the 
renewal premium to American Concept by September 12, 1985 at 12:01 
a.m. (R.81, 83-108, 112). 
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6. In April, 1985, plaintiffs sent a check dated April 
20, 1985, to American Concept which was received April 25, 1985, as 
payment on an installment premium (R.33). American Concept 
accepted the late installment payment without a lapse in coverage 
(R.33). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The circuit court properly granted American Concept's 
Motion for Summary Judgment because plaintiffs' insurance contract 
automatically terminated on September 12, 1985, at 12:01 a.m. 
standard time, over two days prior to plaintiffs' automobile 
accident. The contract terms as to automatic termination were 
never modified by the parties to the contract. The contract 
required prompt payment of the premium to American Concept prior to 
the due date. There is no evidence of waiver or estoppel in that 
American Concept has never accepted a renewal premium payment after 
the policy had automatically terminated per the contract terms. As 
a matter of law, American Concept's acceptance of one installment 
premium mailed on or about the due date does not constitute a 
custom or a waiver of the express contract terms on automatic 
termination. The terms of the contract control and are binding 
upon the plaintiff and the court properly granted American Con-
cept's Motion. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EXPRESS TERMS OF THE CONTRACT EVIDENCE AS A 
MATTER OF LAW THERE WAS NO COVERAGE FOR THE 
ACCIDENT. 
The express terms of the insurance contract govern the 
relationship between the plaintiffs and American Concept. The 
contract terms verify the Circuit Court properly granted American 
Concept's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
The insurance contract between plaintiffs and American 
Concept provides for automatic termination of the contract on 
September 12, 1985, at 12:01 a.m. The renewal billing sent to the 
plaintiffs expressly states the contract will expire on September 
12, 1985, if the premium is not sent to the company prior to the 
due date. Plaintiffs' insurance identification card for their 
vehicle, and plaintiffs1 declaration records also positively state 
the policy's termination date. Plaintiffs' premium was not sent 
per the contract terms, and the policy terminated on September 12, 
1985 at 12:01 a.m. 
American Concept's liability and responsibility to the 
plaintiffs ended by its providing noticfe of the cancellation date 
and by obeying the terms of the contract. Any further liability 
for the accident that occurred more than two days after the policy 
ended was the responsibility of the plaintiffs. American Concept 
should not be held liable to plaintiffs for its adherence to the 
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contract terms when the plaintiffs failed to prevent the automatic 
termination. 
An insurance company is not obligated to provide coverage 
beyond the terms of its policy. Kimball v. Kingsbury, 493 P.2d 300 
(Utah 1972); Wickes v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 
496 P.2d 267 (Utah 1972). In Kimball the Utah Supreme Court upheld 
the policy provisions and denied coverage to the plaintiffs on an 
accident that had occurred after a lapse in coverage. The accident 
occurred on October 8, 1968. The premium, per the contract terms, 
was due on the 26th day of each month. A past due notice was 
mailed on October 1st and normally delivered in Salt Lake on 
October 4th. The contract required cancellation if the September 
26th payment was not made within 10 days of the due date. Plain-
tiffs mailed their check on October 7th, postmarked October 8th, 
which was received by the insurance company on October 11th. The 
Court denied coverage because plaintiffs had simply failed to 
comply with the terms of their contract. The court explained: 
It is obvious that at the time of the collision 
the policy had lapsed and there was no cover-
age. We hold, as the trial court did, that 
there was no waiver of payment on the due date 
or date of grace, that the terms of the policy 
were clear and that Nationwide cannot be held 
by depositing the check after receipt thereof 
on an apparent reinstatement basis. 
Id. at 301. The policy terms were followed and coverage was 
denied. 
The Court reached a similar conclusion in Wickes, supra. 
In Wickes, the insured's contract with State Farm was for six 
6 
months with an automatic renewal if the premium was paid prior to 
the expiration date on the policy. There was no grace period 
provided in the policy. State Farm did, however, have a standing 
offer to renew a policy without a lapse in coverage if the premium 
was paid within 10 days following the expiration date. It also had 
a policy that it would renew the policy effective the date of 
receipt of the premium if the same was received within 40 days 
after the expiration date of the policy. The expiration dates were 
February 1 and August 1. 
The original policy terminated February 1, 1969 and was 
reinstated February 18, 1969. The premium paid for February 18, 
1969 to August 1, 1969, with no charge for the 18-day period when 
the policy was not in force. 
On August 2, 1969, plaintiffs1 husband lost his life. 
Notice had been sent to the deceased stating the above-terms of the 
policy and the termination date. No premium was sent to State Farm 
within the 10-day period following the expiration date. A check 
dated August 13, 1969, was sent in an envelope bearing a postmark 
date of August 16, 1969, and was received August 18, 1969. The 
Court denied coverage for the August 2, 1969 death. The Court 
expressly held: 
The provisions of an insurance policy must be 
enforced as written, and they cannot be changed 
or modified in favor of the insured except by a 
writing signed by the insurer. No such writing 
was ever made by the defendant, and, therefore, 
the provisions of the policy must govern the 
decision in this case. The policy had expired 
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on August 1, 1969, and was not pursuant to its 
terms reinstated. 
496 P.2d at 269 (emphasis added). 
The express terms of the insurance contract between 
plaintiffs and American Concept must be enforced as written and the 
provisions of the contract must govern this Court's decision in 
this case. The policy by its terms expired on September 12, 1987, 
at 12:01 a.m. The contract and notice provide that coverage would 
automatically terminate if the required premium was not received by 
the company prior to the expiration date of the policy. The 
required premium was not received for nearly five days following 
the expiration date and after the accident. The contract is clear; 
no coverage is provided. 
American Concept does not rely upon the contract provi-
sions alone to give notice to the plaintiffs. On August 13, 1985, 
a renewal billing and notice of expiration was sent to the plain-
tiffs. The notice conclusively states that the policy would end 
September 12, 1985. This notice was sent to the insured at the 
address shown on the policy as is required under Utah law. This is 
sufficient proof of the notice. Utah Code Ann. § 31-41-19 (1953 as 
amended). No grace period was given or implied. As stated by the 
Arizona Supreme Court in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Robison, 461 P.2d 520, 524 (Az. 1970): "No grace period 
exists unless there is either a statutory provision or a provision 
in the contract of insurance. (Cite omitted). Here the policy did 
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not provide for a grace period and the Arizona statutes require 
none." Accord, Wickes, 496 P.2d at 269. 
Utah law does not provide for a grace period. The 
contract does not provide for a grace period. The policy lapsed 
September 12, 1987, at 12:01 a.m. and no coverage was provided 
after that date. 
While the result may be unfortunate, the fault lies with 
the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs could have simply mailed their premium 
as soon as they received their notice of the approaching termina-
tion date. Instead they choose to wait until after coverage and 
the contract had terminated. American Concept did all that was 
required under the contract and even sent an additional notice of 
the pending lapse in coverage. As expressed by the Court in 
Wickes: 
It is to be regretted that a $10,000 policy was 
not reinstated by the simple expedient of 
paying a $48 premium within the 10-day period 
following termination of the policy. The trial 
judge, however, was under a duty to enforce the 
policy according to its terms, not to make new 
terms in order to relieve the plaintiff from a 
default. 
We think he ruled correctly and, therefore, 
affirm the judgment. 
496 P.2d at 270. 
The contract terms govern. There was no breach by 
American Concept. The judgment should be affirmed. 
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A. MAILING OF A PREMIUM DOES NOT SATISFY THE CONTRACT 
REQUIREMENTS FOR PAYMENT OF THE PREMIUM PRIOR TO THE DUE DATE. 
The contract and notice indicate the premium must be paid 
to the company prior to the expiration of the policy. Plaintiffs 
appear to claim that Mrs. Clarke's deposit of the premium check on 
her mailbox after the policy expired somehow extends the contract 
terms. Plaintiffs1 argument is factually and legally flawed. The 
policy expired at 12:01 a.m. on September 12, 1985. The date and 
time are unquestionably set forth in the declaration page on the 
policy. Plaintiffs did not even place the premium on their mailbox 
until after the policy expired. The mailman did not collect the 
premium until the following day. The postmark is September 13, 
1985. Even if the Court found plaintiffs1 own mailbox a deposi-
tory, the policy had lapsed prior to the premium being deposited. 
Courts are reluctant to make the mailbox a depository for 
insurance premiums. Thomason v. Schnorr, 587 P.2d 1205 (Colo. App. 
1978); Hammond v. Mo. Prop. Ins. Placement Fac, 731 S.W.2d 360 
(Mo. App. 1987) . Mailing is insufficient and the premium is not 
considered paid until it is received by the insurer, absent a 
course of dealings that the insurer has adopted the postal authori-
ties as its agents. Thomason, 587 P. 2d at 1206; see also, 
Butkovich v. Industrial Commission, 690 P.2d 257 (Colo. App. 1984) 
(placement of premium in mails prior to due date was insufficient 
to extend coverage). As the court declared in Hammond: "One long-
standing and established principle embodied in the law of insurance 
is that the mere depositing of a premium in the mail is not 
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sufficient to effect the renewal of coverage of insurance." Id. at 
365. 
In the present case, the contract does not designate the 
postal authorities as the depository for premiums. There is no 
course of dealings of dating coverage ftom the postmark date that 
would justify extending the contract beyond its terms. American 
Concept's one prior of acceptance of an installment payment mailed 
on or before the due date does not waive this rule. Okamura v. 
Time Insurance Co. , 468 P.2d 958 (Utah 1970) (acceptance of one 
late premium payment as a matter of law dloes not establish a course 
of dealings). Plaintiffs1 renewal payment was too late and the 
contract cannot be extended beyond its contract terms. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS NO WAIVER, OR 
ESTOPPEL THAT CHANGED THE EXPRESS CONTRACT 
TERMS. 
A. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT AMERICAN CONCEPT CONTINUED 
COVERAGE TO PLAINTIFFS FOR PREMIUMS SENT AFTER THE AUTOMATIC 
TERMINATION DATE. 
Since the inception of the policy, plaintiffs made 
installment payments regularly and timely. On one occasion, 
plaintiffs mailed an installment payment on or about the due date 
which was received and accepted after the due date by American 
Concept. American Concept has never accepted a renewal premium 
payment after the policy had automatically terminated. There is no 
evidence of a waiver of the contract terms that would estop 
American Concept from requiring prompt payment of the renewal 
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premium in its office by September 12, 1985 at 12:01 a.m. The 
policy, declaration page, insurance identification card and notice 
all positively set forth the automatic termination date. This 
Court should uphold the terms of the contract. 
B. AS A MATTER OF LAW, EVEN ONE ACCEPTANCE OF A LATE 
PAYMENT DOES NOT WAIVE THE STRICT POLICY PROVISIONS ON AUTOMATIC 
TERMINATION. 
Even if this Court finds as plaintiffs contends that in 
April, 1985, American Concept waived its policy terms by accepting 
a premium payment received in its office after the due date without 
a lapse in coverage, as a matter of law this one prior acceptance 
does not waive the strict contract requirements on the September 
12, 1985 payment. The renewal premium, by contract, was to be in 
American Concept's office by September 12, 1985 at 12:01 a.m. The 
April payment did not change this requirement. A waiver of the 
contract terms can only occur if there is a substantial period of 
time in which the insurance company accepted late payments. 
Okamura v. Time Insurance Co., 468 P.2d 958 (Utah 1970). 
Plaintiffs contend the April, 1985, payment history ever-
lastingly changed the express contract terms and thereby allowed 
plaintiffs to rewrite the contract to allow for free insurance 
coverage until they decided to place their premium on their 
mailbox. Once again, this argument ignores the contract plain-
tiffs wish to enforce. The contract declares: "This policy 
contains all the agreements between you and us. Its terms may not 
be changed or waived except by endorsement issued by us." (R.77 
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Changes). No endorsement was issued for the changes plaintiffs 
wish to assert. 
Plaintiffs argument also fails under Utah law. The Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled that one prior acceptance of a late premium 
without a lapse in coverage (or from the postmark date) will not 
amount to a waiver by the insurance company of strict compliance 
with the insurance policy. Okamura, supra. The facts of Okamura 
are similar to this case. In that dispute the insurance company 
had accepted the second quarterly premium 4 days after the 31 day 
grace period provided by the policy without a lapse in coverage. 
The third quarterly payment was made on February 7, 1968, 6 days 
after the expiration of the 31 day grace period. The Court in 
denying the claim of the plaintiffs for coverage under the policy 
stated: "We are of the opinion that the acceptance of one prior 
premium after the due date is insufficient to constitute a custom 
or usage waiving a requirement of prompt payment. A custom or 
usage exists only when followed for a substantial period of time.11 
Id. at 959 (emphasis added). 
American Concept accepted the April, 1985, premium 
payment which was received in its office after the due date. As in 
the Okamura case, the prior acceptance of one late premium does not 
constitute a waiver of the contract terms. Likewise, the Okamura 
case defeats plaintiffs' argument that American Concept had change 
the requirement of premium payment to their office. Even if 
American Concept had accepted the premium from the postmark date, 
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this one prior acceptance is insufficient to establish a custom of 
accepting premiums from the postmark date. Further, plaintiffs 
date of mailing and postmark date are still after coverage had 
expired. There was nothing to accept when the premium was mailed 
and no coverage was afforded. The circuit court's decision is 
correct. 
The Georgia Supreme Court in Prudential Insurance Company 
of America v. Nessmith. 329 S.E.2d 249 (Georgia 1985) held that as 
a matter of law Prudential's indulgence of accepting late payments 
on two occasions did not evidence a course of conduct to alter the 
terms of the contract. In so ruling the court stated: "Evidence 
of the acceptance of one single overdue premium or assessment or of 
a few separate instances, is insufficient of itself to establish a 
waiver of forfeiture claim for non-payment of a subsequent premium 
or assessment." Id., quoting from Sovereign Camp W.O.W. v. 
Whitaker, 195 S.E. 584 (Georgia App. 1938). 
As in the Okamura case, American Concept's acceptance of 
one premium mailed on or prior to the due date does not establish a 
custom or waiver of its requirement for prompt payment. The policy 
automatically terminated on September 12, 1985, at 12:01 a.m. The 
premium was not mailed until after termination of the contract. 
The contract provisions govern and accordingly, American Concept's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. 
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CONCLUSION 
The insurance contract between plaintiff and defendant 
provided that the policy would automatically expire if the required 
premium was not paid before the expiration date on the policy. A 
renewal billing and notice of cancellation sent to the plaintiffs 
on August 13, 1985, stated the policy would automatically terminate 
on September 2, 1985. The contract was never modified. Factually, 
there is no custom or usage to extend coverage and as a matter of 
law, the acceptance of one premium mailed on the due date does not 
constitute a custom or waiver of the express policy terms. The 
circuit court properly granted American Concept's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. This Court should uphold that decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 ^ day of October, 1987. 
CHRISTENSElN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C. 
BV 0 ^ f>. 97?J"d*^ 
J&n P. ^almbetg ^ 
Attorneys for Defendants/ 
Respondents 
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